Antiochus the Great Read online

  Linked to great steppes of Eurasia, the Iranian plateau was vulnerable to waves of nomadic peoples sweeping down from the north. While the Caucasus mountains between the Black and Caspian seas provided a formidable natural barrier to Steppe invaders, Iran was vulnerable to infiltration east of the Caspian. In the Middle Ages, Iran would suffer from the incursions of nomadic armies led by Genghis Khan and Timor the Lame. In the third century BC, the menacing nomads were called the Parni, but they eventually acquired the name of the satrapy they infiltrated: Parthia.

  Governance

  How did the Seleucid kings manage to govern this enormous landmass, especially given the slow communications that plagued the ancient world? It is unlikely that the speediest of messengers would make 150–200 miles in a day on horseback. For purposes of comparison, riders on the nineteenth-century American pony express rarely covered more than 200 miles a day, and this was with a fresh horse every ten miles. Such a breakneck pace without renewal would quickly kill both horse and man. Estimates for the speed of the later Roman Imperial post suggest a distance of no more than 50 miles a day; there is no reason to suggest the Seleucids managed anything better.49 At this speed it could take forty days (under the best circumstances) to send a message 2000 miles from Antioch to Bactria, and almost three months before the timeliest of replies.

  Solutions to the problem of governance and slow communication had been identified. After all, the Seleucids controlled much of the same territory formerly occupied by the Achaemenid Persians, and they naturally adopted many elements of the Persian system. Key to Persian governance was a system of decentralized provinces, ruled by officials called satraps. The term satrap was a Greek bastardization of the Old Persian word chsacapava, ‘protector of the kingdom’. By the reign of Antiochus III the Greek term strategos (general) was preferred (or occasionally eparchos, ‘governor’), but the term ‘satrap’ was still used unofficially.50 Strategoi served at the pleasure the king, and generally were of Greek or Macedonian descent. Given the slow pace of communication, satraps enjoyed relative autonomy, as long as they kept peace and forwarded a steady stream of tax revenue to the royal treasury. Satraps maintained military garrisons and even convened mini-courts. Yet because of their independence, the risk that a satrap would revolt and claim more power (or independence) was high; the best control against satrapal over-reach was nepotism: placing trusted friends or relatives in satrapies.51

  The Seleucids also mimicked the Persian custom of multiple royal capitals. The Achaemenids had maintained administrative centres with royal residences along the king’s imperial circuit: the most important Persian capitals were Sardis, Persepolis and Susa. In a similar way, Seleucid royal centres at Sardis, Antioch, and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, anchored the key regions (respectively) of Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia. Antiochus III later envisioned a royal centre at Lysimacheia to control Thrace, with his cadet son installed as governor, and established a semipermanent residence at Ephesus, on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor.

  The extensive frontier of the empire often required the king to fight multiple wars simultaneously. Although the king would often personally lead an army in the most critical area of operations, he had to be willing to trust sizeable military forces to other generals and geographic areas. These independent generals posed a greater risk to the king than did the satraps. Satraps controlled only modest and scattered garrisons, but a general with a field army could prove very dangerous indeed. In selecting generals, personal loyalty at times eclipsed military competence. When possible, Seleucid kings tapped close relatives to command field armies – preferably sons, but also brothers and cousins. Unfortunately, relatives with royal blood in their veins were also prone to revolt, as evidenced by Antiochus Hierax against Seleucus II, and later Achaeus, the rebel cousin of Antiochus III.

  The Seleucid king lived in a world with no newspapers or equivalent to mass media. He had no organized intelligence source and frequently lacked good information when making critical decisions. Information about the outside world filtered in through contacts in court, tradesmen, ambassadors, and mercenary captains.52 Diplomatic links were also crucial sources: the Seleucids would have maintained such links with neighbouring counties and sought to reinforce them when necessary through marriage or other means. A few books circulated that could fill in knowledge gaps concerning nations farther away. For example, if Antiochus III wanted to learn about the barbarian people called the Romans, he could read the history of Rome written by the senator Fabius Pictor, who had recently published a treatise (c. 200 BC) in Greek to explain his society to Hellenic audiences. Nonetheless, when analysing the decisions made by ancient leaders, it is important to remember that they operated with very limited information, frequently basing critical decisions on little more than hearsay or rumour.

  The Mediterranean world of Antiochus III

  The Seleucid Empire was one of five major powers that emerged following the end of the wars of the Successors. Two others were also ‘Hellenistic’ powers, ruled by Macedonian dynasties descended from successor warlords. The descendants of Seleucus’ old ally Ptolemy controlled Egypt (the dynasty is sometimes referred to as the ‘Lagids,’ after Ptolemy I’s father Lagos). Macedonia was controlled by the descendants of Antigonus One-Eyed and Demetrius the Besieger, known as the ‘Antigonids’ by modern historians.

  In a twist of historical coincidence, all three Hellenistic states acquired young kings at approximately the same time. Nineteen-year-old Antiochus III became king in 223 BC, Ptolemy IV assumed the diadem in Egypt in 221 BC at the age of twenty-three, and seventeen-year-old Philip V obtained full regal powers in Macedonia in 221 upon the death of his regent and co-king, his uncle Antigonus III Doson. The youth of these kings was not seen necessarily as a liability by their contemporaries. After all, Alexander the Great had become king at the age of nineteen. Beauty and adolescent brashness were admired features in Hellenistic kings. Indeed, fat and middle-aged Hellenistic kings tended to display themselves as young and vigorous men, harkening back to the youth and vigour of Alexander, who died at the age of thirty-three.53

  A long tradition of friendship prevailed between the Antigonid and Seleucid kings, dating back to the political match between Stratonice and Seleucus. Antiochus III would have a grandson named Demetrius, a traditional Antigonid dynastic moniker. This friendship and natural alliance was helped along by the fact that neither side shared a contested border. But Seleucid relations with the Ptolemies were another matter entirely, as has been discussed previously. Although Ptolemy I and Seleucus I had cooperated against Antigonus One-Eyed and Demetrius the Besieger, contestations around the shared borders of their empire would lead to generations of warfare.

  The Antigonid relations with the Ptolemies also proved frequently hostile. Although based firmly in Egypt, the Ptolemies controlled a great maritime empire that included the Aegean islands, Cyprus, territories on the coast of Asia Minor and Thrace, on the doorstep of the Macedonian king. Furthermore, Ptolemaic kings had traditionally sought to undermine Macedonian imperial authority by supporting the independent aspirations of Macedonian subject peoples. In the 260s, Ptolemy II funded Athens and Sparta in their revolt against Macedonian hegemony.54 In the 220s, Ptolemy III would bankroll the ambitions of the upstart Spartan king Cleomenes, who was defeated by Macedonian troops in 222.

  In terms of population, the King of Macedonia ruled over approximately 300,000 ethnic Macedonian subjects.55 He could raise field armies of between 20,000 and 40,000 men, yet was required to devote thousands of additional soldiers to garrison duties. Macedonia was the traditional policeman of Greece’s northern border and took responsibility for keeping the barbarian Illyrian, Dardanian, and Danubian tribesmen from rampaging the south. The King of Macedonia also controlled tremendous natural resources, including some of the best timberlands in the eastern Mediterranean. Silver and gold mines financed expensive military operations; according to one source, the Macedonian king received at least 1000 silver talents a
year from his mines alone (1 talent = 6000 drachmas, or roughly 26 kilograms; a silver talent could purchase enough grain to feed 100 people for an entire year).56

  Despite the natural resources in Macedonia, the Ptolemaic king of Egypt controlled the finest and most productive agricultural land in the Mediterranean: the Nile valley. Every year, Nile floods deposited rich layers of silt, giving Egypt spectacular crop yields. Between four to seven million peasants worked the land to harvest this agricultural bounty. The Ptolemies were also effective and systematic tax collectors; their yearly income is given at between 12,000 and 14,800 silver talents.57 The bounty of the Nile allowed the Ptolemies to maintain a maximum of 90,000 troops in field armies and garrison and to deploy an impressive fleet.

  Like the Seleucid king, the Antigonid and Ptolemaic kings were absolute monarchs. They ruled with no checks on their power; all claimed to rule land that was ‘spear-won’ (doriktetos chora). In physical appearance, the basileus distinguished himself with a cloth band knotted around his head called a diadem; it is still disputed whether the symbol originated in the Macedonian or Persian court.58 He carried a sceptre, a Greek royal symbol since the time of Iliad, and wore an expensive purple robe, dyed with a purple laboriously extracted from crushed murex snails. Favourite courtiers of the king were also distinguished by their expensive purple robes, which the king might personally rip from the body should a courtier fall from the king’s favour.59

  Classical Greek political theory was traditionally hostile to the idea of absolute kingship, which in its extreme form was believed to degenerate into violent hubris: paranoid monarchs fearing competition and butchering the talented men of their realm.60 While Plato chose a king to lead the ideal state of his Politikon (Republic), the said king had also experienced a rather unusual philosophical epiphany.

  With the rise of Alexander and his successors, however, political theorists made necessary and politic adjustments. As warlords became kings, a new theory of kingship arose, a philosophical and political strain that emphasized the special competence of the king in military and administrative spheres. Indeed, most successors delayed coronation until they achieved a major success on the battlefield.61 The most famous expression of this new view of kingship is found in the Suda, a Byzantine encyclopaedia that preserves earlier threads of Greek thought:

  Monarchy: It is neither descent nor legitimacy which gives monarchies to men, but the ability to command and army and to handle affairs competently. Such was the case with Philip and the successors of Alexander. For Alexander’s natural son was in no way helped by his kinship with him, because of his weakness of spirit, while those who had no connection with Alexander became kings of almost the whole inhabited world. (Suda s.v. basileia; Austin Hellenistic World, 45).

  The implications of such a view were chilling to a king who failed as a general and administrator. He could expect to be liquidated and replaced. However, dynastic continuity proved a strong force in most of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Among the Ptolemies, strong-willed ministers compensated for the failings of weak or immature monarchs. In Macedonia, the boy king Philip V was not murdered, but assigned his uncle Antigonus Doson as regent and co-king. It was the elites of the Seleucid Empire who displayed the strongest proclivity to assassinate kings who failed as generals and administrators, as happened to Antiochus’ brother Seleucus III. A similar fate would befall his son Seleucus IV.

  In the Western Mediterranean, two non-Hellenic and non-monarchical powers dominated the scene: the Republic of Rome, which headed a powerful Italian confederacy, and the African city-state of Carthage, which dominated the fertile agricultural lands in modern day Tunisia and Libya. The two powers were allies for much of their earlier histories, but collided in 264 BC over the island of Sicily. The resulting war from 264 to 242 BC was a narrow Roman victory. Carthage devoted her subsequent military energies to carving out an empire in Spain to compensate for territories lost in this first war. When young Antiochus III assumed power in 223 BC, a tenuous peace prevailed between the powers. It would not last long.

  When the second war with Rome broke out, Carthage raised enormous multi-ethnic armies, fielding upwards of 170,000 men in 215 BC. Carthage also benefited from ample mineral resources in Spain; the prosperous mines around New Carthage alone could generate upwards of 1300 talents a year.62

  In contrast to Carthage’s Iberian bounty, Rome possessed only modest mineral resources. Italy lacks significant gold and silver veins, but possesses impressive iron deposits in Etruria (modern day Tuscany) and on the island of Elba. Without question, Rome’s most bountiful resource was an enormous pool of tough, warlike peasants. In all, some three million free persons inhabited the Italian peninsula in the late third century BC; there were approximately 270,000 adult male Roman citizens in 225 BC. Rome’s Italian coalition could contribute roughly 700,000 adult males of military age, including citizens and allies (socii – hence our word ‘social’).63 In 212 BC, during the second war with Carthage, Rome mustered 25 legions and allied wings, containing between 160,000 and 200,000 men.

  Unlike their Hellenistic counterparts, both Rome and Carthage were republics. This does not mean that they were democracies in the modern sense; rather they were governed through ‘mixed’ constitutions, with senior magistrates (consuls in Rome, suffets in Carthage), a powerful aristocratic body (approximately 300 senators in Rome, 104 ‘judges’ in Carthage), and citizen assemblies that elected magistrates and declared war. This mixed form of governance was much admired by ancient political philosophers; Aristotle praised the constitution of Carthage highly, which he compared favourably to the constitution of Sparta.64 The Greek historian Polybius, heavily influenced by Aristotle’s analysis, later emphasized the efficacy of the checks and balances in the Roman system.65

  The two western republics were tremendously powerful, and by 218 they were again at war. A Greek statesmen speaking before a peace conference in 217 warned assembled dignitaries that they must beware of a ‘cloud now looming in the west’.66 It is unclear whether he meant Rome or Carthage, although at this point Carthage, led by the brilliant tactician Hannibal, had invaded Italy and was unquestionably gaining the upper hand. Any prudent statesman would certainly be wary of the eventual victor in the coming clash. But up to that point, neither Rome nor Carthage had expressed any predatory designs on the Eastern Mediterranean: Carthage focused her expansionism against Sicily and inland Spain; Rome had been occupied for most of the third century with forging and defending the empire in Italy. While raids by Illyrian pirates had prompted two interventions east across the Adriatic Sea, the Romans promptly withdrew their forces once they had overthrown the offending Illyrian dynast.67 Roman expansionism was focused mostly in northern Italy (then dubbed Cis-Alpine Gaul), where land-hungry Roman armies and colonists pushed into the fertile territory of the Po River Valley, occupied by tough Gallic tribes. Given the Romans’ focus on the Italian peninsula, few could have predicted that Antiochus III would confront armies of invading Romans in Asia Minor.

  Both Carthage and Rome maintained polite and peaceful relations with the Hellenistic powers. Carthage’s Libyan possessions bordered on Ptolemaic holdings in Cyrene, but the two shared an amicable border. The Carthaginians maintained relations with the Seleucids that were friendly enough for the Carthaginians to obtain Indian elephants in their herds. Hannibal’s favourite elephant was named ‘Surus’, or ‘the Syrian’, possibly bred in the Seleucid elephant farm at Apamea.68

  Diplomatic contacts between Rome and Ptolemaic Egypt were initiated in the 270s, after Rome repelled the invasions of the Epirote warlord Pyrrhus. The Ptolemaic empire maintained a policy of polite neutrality during the 1st Punic War (264–242 BC).

  Relations between Rome and the Seleucid Empire came much later. At some point during the third century BC, the Roman senate wrote a letter to a king Selecus, requesting that he respect the city of Ilium (Troy).69 Most likely the Seleucus in question was Antiochus III’s father, Seleucus II, who campaigned in the re
gion in the early 220s.70 The city of Ilium held a special significance for the Romans, as they claimed descent through the Trojan hero Aeneas and were accustomed to using mythic genealogies to drive diplomacy with Hellenistic powers.

  In addition to the five major powers, a number of small states that played a role during Antiochus’ reign deserve mention, the dynasts of Anatolia in particular. The most important of these was the Attalid kingdom of Pergamon. Attalus I was the first of his dynasty to call himself a king, but his father Eumenes I and great-uncle Philatairos were both powerful regional dynasts who appeased distant Seleucid overlords by refraining to assume the royal title.

  On the northern coast of Anatolia, facing the Black Sea, were the kingdoms of Bithynia and Pontus, and in the eastern highlands of Anatolia lay the rugged kingdom of Cappadocia. All three were ruled by native families, who nonetheless adopted a Hellenic veneer and surrounded themselves with most of the trappings of Hellenistic kingship. Pontus, in particular, maintained close ties with the Seleucid empire, including a tradition of intermarriage with the Seleucid royal family.

  In theory, the Greek city-states within mainland Greece and along the coast of Asia Minor were independent entities. During the wars of the successors, various warlords had proclaimed the slogan ‘freedom (elutheria) for the Greeks’ in order to gain the support of these proud if increasingly impotent communities.71 In reality, however, only a few city-states managed to hold their own in the tumultuous environment of the third century BC, and freedom was generally interpreted loosely, so that ‘free’ cities endured royal garrisons and paid tribute (phoros) to the royal fisc.